Palestine!



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INSIDE STORY OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON PALESTINE

U.S. Rebuffs Washington PLO Office

Within the past several months major newspapers, and even a number of progressive publications, have carried reports that the U.S. government is moving toward a rapprochment with the PLO and toward endorsement of a Palestinian state, and moreover, that Palestinian aspirations have been "moderated" to suit conservative Arab regimes and the U.S. government. A spate of such articles appeared, ironically, at a time when the U.S. government rejected an attempt to open a PLO office in Washington and revealed once again its continued hostility to any expression of the Palestinian national reality.

When examined closely, the story of this U.S. rebuff to the PLO casts light on the recent history of U.S. government maneuvers to prevent the realization of Palestinian aspirations.

The following report is based on over 40 separate interviews with persons involved in the events described, including several of the major participants, as well as on government documents and other written sources. Each detail was double or triple checked, and crucial details were included only if they were verified by the public record or by several independent sources.

On October 19, 1976, Sabri Jiryis arrived at Kennedy Airport in New York. Jiryis, a Palestinian lawyer, intended to explore the possibility of opening an office in Washington in the name of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Jiryis' efforts, and those of his associates, did not produce an office, but they did inadvertently create a widely reported incident which—though not in itself very significant—sheds light on the process of formulation of U.S. policy towards the PLO.

Jiryis was met at the airport by Professor Norton Mezvinsky, an American who has been engaged for some years in his own private diplomatic campaign to achieve a Middle East settlement, including a Palestinian state, under U.S. auspices. Mezvinsky had been urging the PLO for about a year to open an office in Washington, which he saw as a useful step in bringing the PLO and U.S. government closer together. He strongly approved of Jiryis, a man of moderate ideas strikingly similar to Mezvinsky's own, as a potential director for such an office. Jiryis had published a series of articles in May 1975 in the Beirut daily *An Nahar*, advocating "suspension" of the armed struggle and a

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ARAB STATES IN NEW ROLE

PLO Endures in Lebanon

The Syrian tanks which rolled into west Beirut on November 15, and thereafter into most other areas of Lebanon previously held by the Palestinian and nationalist Lebanese forces, brought with them a kind of peace. But it was peace only in the most restricted sense of the word, a cessation of the intense civil violence which had wracked Lebanon for over a year and a half, and not a solution of the massive social, political and economic conflicts which had sparked the armed conflict. Mixed with the relief which the population felt as the fighting subsided, there was, on the Lebanese nationalist-Palestinian side, a concern—which later events showed to be well founded—that the Arab security force dominated by Syrian troops would act as a repressive agency against the Palestinian and left Lebanese organizations.

In October, just a month before, the Syrian army had seemed to be on its way to a bloody battle to enter the cities and coastal areas held by the nationalists. In the fierce fighting at Aley and Bhandum, Palestinian and left Lebanese forces fought house to house against the Syrian army and inflicted heavy casualties on the Syrians, and gave them clear warning that although the Syrians had the preponderant military strength, they could expect to enter nationalist territory only at great cost.

At that juncture, the Arab states invoked a ceasefire in Lebanon with the Riyadh and Cairo agreements. The agreements did not put an end to the conflict between the Syrian regime and the Palestinians and left Lebanese; it merely changed the political-legal framework of the struggle. The principal changes

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Palestinians training in Lebanon recently.

REPORT FROM LEBANON

Tal Az Za'atar Refugees Regroup

The following account was written by a Palestine! *staff member who was in Damour and other parts of Lebanon in mid-November.*

In the town of Damour, located south of Beirut on a hillside overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, men organized by the Palestinian resistance movement are at work fitting new doors and windows onto the heavily damaged stone houses. They are trying to make the buildings habitable for the thousands of Palestinians and poor Lebanese who recently moved into the empty town after their own homes near Beirut were seized by right wing militias.

Last January the Palestinian forces and Lebanese nationalists captured the town from the militias of the right wing, in retaliation for a brutal offensive which the right had launched around Beirut. The right had laid seige to the Tal az Zaatar and Jisr al Basha refugee camps, cutting off the supply of food not only to the Palestinian residents, but also to the many thousands of impoverished Lebanese who lived around the camps. Another refugee camp, Dabaye, was overrun by the right wing in January and its inhabitants forcibly expelled, their homes destroyed.

Since September, an al Fatah cadre who now works in Damour explained, some 6,000 people have moved into Damour, from which the former townspeople, Maronite and mostly loyal to the right, fled last January. The new residents are mostly Palestinians, refugees from Tal az Zaatar, which was captured by the right in August after a brutal seige of fifty-three days. The heroic resistance by the Palestinian residents is now a legend in Lebanon and beyond. The new population of Damour has also come, in smaller numbers, from other quarters of the slums around Beirut where the homes of poor Lebanese were captured by the right.

After being driven from Tal az Zaatar, where many of their relatives died in the battle, or in the massacre which followed the surrender of the camp, many of the survivors of Tal az Zaatar initially gathered in Beirut's Sports City, a stadium in west Beirut. Meanwhile, those captured at Tal az Zaatar were suffering a gruesome end in the areas held by the right. The *Economist* (London) has reported that prisoners from Tal az Zaatar were burned at the stake, as hundreds of adherents of the right looked on.

Later, the refugees from Tal az Zaatar trickled down the fifteen mile route south to the empty town of Damour. There they crowded, often a few families per house, into the stone buildings, now damaged or gutted, which once made substantial and comfortable homes for their Lebanese owners. Samad, the Palestinian agency which provides employment for relatives of fighters killed in the struggle, has established a carpentry workshop in Damour, and workers from Samad are now busy installing doors and windows as barriers to the chill of the night. Some of these are doors and windows brought from Beirut, but other homes are being refurbished with doors thriftily constructed in Damour from the wood of used ammunition crates.

RESISTANCE PROVIDES FOOD

Nearly all the new residents of Damour are entitled to rations and services from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), but UNRWA's apparatus has virtually collapsed. An UNRWA truck does deliver water, but it is insufficient for the needs of the people, who consequently must resort to the damaged and unsanitary water supply of the town. For food the people turn to the Palestinian resistance movement, which issues them blue ration cards and supplies of flour, rice, sugar and other staples. These items can be supplemented with vegetables and eggs purchased from a shop established by Samad.

In Tal az Zaatar, many of the people had been able to find some employment, even if unstable and poorly paid. Small factories and workshops grew up around the camp and elsewhere in the capital, exploiting the convenient source of cheap labor. But now, expelled from their homes and with the Lebanese economy devastated, job opportunities are very scarce. However, in addition to those it has put to work making emergency repairs to homes, Samad employs a number of people in two workshops, similar to those it operated at Tal az Zaatar. At one, military uniforms are manufactured for the fighters, by about twenty persons, mostly young girls. At the other, an additional twenty men and women are producing heavy canvas bags for carrying bullets, RBJ missiles and other military supplies, and leather articles for sale.

For a group of people who so recently experienced catastrophe, the squatters at Damour show remarkable spirit and continuing political committment. Al Fatah particularly has organized an impressive amount of activity in the camp.

CHILDREN ORGANIZED

About 750 children are enrolled in the quasi-military youth organizations, the Ashbal (Lion Cubs) for boys, and Zahrat (Flowers) for girls. These activities, which had been in progress for the past six years at Tal az Zaatar, provide training in the use and maintenance of various weapons, as well as political and cultural education. In addition, a school has been opened for the children in Damour by a staff of volunteer teachers.

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (analogous to the Red Cross, and affiliated to the PLO) has established a clinic and is refitting a hospital in Damour, formerly operated by the government but completely empty when the Red Crescent took it over, explains Dr. Hamid, the young doctor now responsible for the clinic. He adds that rheumatism, chest colds and more serious lung conditions are a common problem in the town "because many of the people are sleeping still in houses without doors and windows, without mattresses or adequate bedding, without sufficient clothing..." Another condition widespread in the town is eye infection, including trachoma, traceable to the poor sanitary conditions. Dr. Hamid, decrying a lack of medications and equipment, warns: "If we aren't able to get some teramycine ointment, eye drops and other drugs, I'm afraid that some of our patients will go blind."

The most serious health problems in the camp are found among children, primarily among infants under one year, and next among those under six-years-old. These problems are due basically to poor nutrition, a problem not just now at Damour, but also over a longer period during the seige of Tal az Zaatar, where "15 to 20 children a day were dying," he says.

Another doctor, a German pediatrician, who, like a number of Europeans, volunteered to help during the crisis, explains, "We hear very, very often from mothers [who had been breastfeeding their infants] that they lost their milk due to the shock of the war and their experiences at Tal az Zaatar. Now they have no money to buy milk for the babies, especially if they lost a husband in the fighting, and probably other male relatives as well. They can ask a neighbor once, maybe even two or three times, but then what are they to do? The people here are all very poor. Many times I prescribe milk and food for children with nutritional deficiencies, but," she goes on to explain, "we have no nutritional supplements here to give them."

When a visitor commented that it must be very difficult for mothers to sterilize bottles in the conditions such as those at

Damour, the doctor laughed with a trace of bitterness: "We don't even ask the mothers to sterilize the bottles, just to wash them. And even that is very hard, because of the problems of water supply, and the lack of fuel. So we see a lot of severe diarrhea in babies."

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS FLED

The displaced persons living now in Tal az Zaatar are part of a much larger problem arising from the Lebanese civil war. The Red Cross estimates that 350,000 people fled from their homes near Beirut and other areas of heavy fighting to the south of Lebanon, and an additional 300,000 people fled to the center of the country and to the Bekaa plain. Approximately 100,000 are believed to have left for the areas of northern Lebanon controlled by the right wing forces. For a privileged minority, seeking refuge from the war has meant a pleasant stay in a Paris hotel—with the possibility of finding a lucrative sideline in arms export to the right wing Phalangists. But for many more, it has meant destitution and desperation. According to the figures of the Red Cross, only 50,000 of the 300,000 who fled to the south have sufficient means to live, and others have been taken in by relatives. And some 40-50,000 in the south, the Red Cross says, are still housed in schools or in the open in damaged buildings.

The most acute suffering appears to be among those who were in the most impoverished condition before the war. Scores of thousands of Palestinians and poor Lebanese were expelled from their homes in the chain of refugee camps and slums called the "Belt of Misery" around Beirut when reactionary forces overran and destroyed their homes.

In mid-November, after the fighting stopped, people could look down the hill from Damour and watch cars, piled high with mattresses and other household goods, filled with people driving back from the south, where they had sought safety in Sidon, to some neighborhoods of Beirut which had not fallen to the right. But the future of the people from an Naba, Maslakh, Qarantina, Tal az Zaatar and other quarters seized by the right in the Belt of Misery is very much in doubt.

Apparently the upper classes represented by the new Lebanese government of President Elias Sarkis have come to understand the threat posed to them by the "Belt of Misery." There, in addition to the Palestinians, hundreds of thousands of poor Lebanese flocked in the last fifteen years to seek relief from the worsening conditions in the rural areas. Such a concentration of destitute people, within sight of the wealth and power centers of the capital, provided a ready and strategically well placed base for the Lebanese left. Moreover, the Sarkis regime is apparently unprepared to insist that the impoverished Palestinian and Lebanese displaced persons be allowed to return to those parts of the "Belt of Misery" now occupied by the right since their ouster during the war, perhaps the major victory which the right can claim.

BANKER PLANS ECONOMY

Lebanese President Elias Sarkis has had his new head of cabinet, Salim al Hoss, chairman of the Development Bank, drawing up plans for the reconstruction of the Lebanese economy. In an interview with the authoritative *Middle East Economic Digest,* Ghassan Tueni, cabinet minister and Chairman of the Interministerial Committee for Reconstruction, revealed that the Hoss Plan includes measures meant to discourage the return of people to their homes in the "Belt of Misery." Tueni also said: "Another scheme that has been approved is to move industries away from the urban center and establish industrial areas in the country—in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa and the north. We want for a variety of reasons to break the misery belt around Beirut. Accordingly we are going to offer industrialists incentives to move away, to where labor is now."

In Damour itself the new residents are uncertain how long they will remain. One young man, an al Fatah cadre, said, "Our homes are in Palestine, and it is to Palestine, not anywhere else, that we want to return. Our presence here in Damour is a political factor for the resistance to work out with all the parties and groups in Lebanon. We will go to any place that the Revolution finds for us. I don't know how long we will stay here, and we don't know if we will be able to return to Tal az Zaatar.

"But always," he said, in the words of a slogan postered on the walls of Damour, "Tal az Zaatar is in our hearts." □

Lebanese Rightists Issue Racist Poster

This poster was issued by a headquarters of the leading Lebanese reactionary party, the Phalange, in the city of Jounieh, the rump capital of the right-wing. It shows the extent to which the Lebanese right has absorbed racism to justify its actions.

"You see," a member of the Phalange party explained animatedly to a recent visitor, "this shows how we Lebanese are not only fighting against the Palestinians, but against all Arabs, the Africans, the Asians, all the black and yellow people." The young man, wearing around his neck a large cross, which is virtually a part of the uniform of the reactionary fighters, pointed out with relish the details of the poster: the ring in the nose of the African caricature, the Fu Manchu-style of the Asian figure.

Another Phalangist in the headquarters added: "In Lebanon we have the same problem with the Palestinians that you have in the US.. with the blacks and Puerto Ricans—ignorant people, coming to a beautiful country that we have built up and destroying it. Just like happened in the U.S."



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diplomatic campaign for a Palestinian state which would recognize Israel.

Jiryis, and Dr. Issam Sartawi, who was soon to join him in the U.S., had in fact been involved in such a diplomatic campaign for quite a while. They spoke as representatives of the PLO, though they often acknowledged in private meetings that the proposals they were presenting for a Middle East settlement were not the publicly proclaimed policy of the PLO. Their approach differed in a number of ways from the official diplomacy of the PLO conducted under Farouq Kaddoumi, the head of the PLO's Political Bureau and its virtual Foreign Minister.

Sartawi and Jiryis, on the one hand, believed that the only way to obtain a Palestinian state, as Jiryis had written in *an Nahar*, was through negotiations with Israel under pressure from the U.S.; their diplomatic thrust was, consequently, a series of conciliatory statements, containing concessions toward Israel at variance with the official PLO program, and the development of contacts to try to achieve negotiations with the U.S. and the Israeli government.

While Sartawi and Jiryis repeatedly have stated that the PLO would be willing to accept as a final solution to the Palestine problem a Palestinian state which would coexist with a "sovereign Jewish state" on the basis of "mutual recognition," more official PLO spokesmen have refused to pledge PLO recognition of the state of Israel and do not renounce a democratic state in all of Palestine as an ultimate goal. Rather than finding armed struggle as a drawback, or mass political struggle as irrelevant, the official PLO diplomacy has tended to make its greatest gains when the armed movement in Lebanon was at a strong point, and when the people of the West Bank were staging militant demonstrations. Furthermore, instead of attempting to open negotiations with Israel and the U.S. at this time, official PLO diplomacy has focused on isolating them in the United Nations General Assembly, through large majority votes relying for the core of support on the Arab countries, other third world and socialist countries, and cutting into the traditional support for the U.S. among the Western European states.

ARRIVAL IN THE U.S.

Issam Sartawi arrived in New York a week after Jiryis. Dr. Sartawi, a cardiac surgeon trained in the U.S., is believed to have close connections with Egypt. Egyptian Intelligence funded the small commando group he established in 1969, the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine. (The Action Organization experienced fleeting fame in a spectacular attack on an El Al jet in Munich, killing one and wounding eight Israelis.) Hewing to the line of the Egyptian regime brought Sartawi briefly into conflict with other fedayeen groups, and armed clashes broke out between his group and others. Later, in 1971, Sartawi's group was merged into al Fateh, of whose Revolutionary Council he has since been a member. Sartawi's connections with Egypt, now that Sadat is so close to the U.S., could only help the Sartawi-Jiryis mission in Washington.

Jiryis and Sartawi had been in Paris before arriving in New York, and met in France with Mattiyeu Peled and others from the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, a Zionist organization seeking a negotiated settlement. The French and Egyptian governments both actively encouraged the talks.

In the U.S. Jiryis and Sartawi met with ten Jewish leaders in New York on November 1, and later in Washington with a group of five officials of Jewish organizations and individuals.

A debate which had been wracking Israel spread to the U.S. as Zionists and the U.S. Jewish community generally took sides on the issue of meetings with the PLO. The talks were, from Sartawi's and Jiryis' point of view, not merely an extension of their meetings with Israelis in Paris, but also an opening salvo in their campaign to establish a Washington office and closer relations with the U.S. government. They held the theory, as Jiryis had written in *an Nahar*, that in the U.S. Jews "almost control" policy, and by neutralizing or even finding support within the Jewish community, they hoped to ease their way in Washington.

INITIAL ENCOURAGEMENT

They were hopeful on arrival that their efforts in Washington would be successful; the indirect contacts that had been going on for a year, especially through Mezvinsky, had encouraged them. Mezvinsky had little advance notice of their arrival and plans to open the office quickly, and apparently U.S. officials were unaware of the exact timing. They were, however, familiar with the plan to open the office.

When Sartawi arrived, Mezvinsky noticed an unusual feature in his travel documents; Mezvinsky thought it likely that U.S. officials were aware of the matter, but to insure that no technicality would disrupt the plans for the office, he promptly flew off to Washington. There Mezvinsky met with Roy Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and showed him the flawed documents. Atherton assured Mezvinsky that the irregularities would not present any problems.

When Sartawi and Jiryis reached Washington by the first week of November, they assembled an informal team to assist them in their probings. In addition to Mezvinsky and his associates, there were Arab ambassadors, chiefly Ashraf Ghorbal of Egypt, and some individual Arabs living in Washington. Also helping were a number of people from the U.S. active in several religious, peace and humanitarian organizations, including the American Friends Service Committee, interested in the Middle East and concerned with achieving a settlement which would, within the overall context of U.S. interests in the region, include a Palestinian state.

While some of these people apparently believed that Sartawi and Jiryis spoke for the PLO as a whole, others were quite aware that they represented a minority viewpoint and were eager to support them. One man in Washington recalled that he received a phone call from the director of a private agency which aids Palestinian refugees and receives funds from U.S.A.I.D. The caller commented: "Jiryis and Sartawi really don't have the blessing of the people back home. It's important that they're successful." To help them "succeed," the agency director urged him to assist in arranging meetings for the Palestinians with influential people in Washington.

MEETINGS WITH U.S. OFFICIALS

In November Sartawi made a presentation before the Council on Foreign Relations, an unofficial but very powerful organization of the country's foreign policy establishment. (President Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, is a member.) Sartawi told the Council that the PLO attitude towards Israel had "evolved remarkably," from the idea of a ,unitary democratic secular state to acknowledgement "that the reality of the situation requires a peace between separate Arab and Jewish nations in Palestine." Jiryis and Sartawi also made the same point in separate meetings with William Fulbright and with other similarly influential figures.

While the State Department denies that Jiryis and Sartawi had any "substantive" discussions with high U.S. officials, they did have contacts, some face-to-face, but more extensively through intermediaries. Ironically, a main conduit for these contacts was Dean Brown, the pistol-packing U.S. ambassador who oversaw the U.S. efforts to help King Hussein eliminate the PLO from Jordan in 1970. Later Brown left the State Department to head the Middle East Institute, a very influential group of retired diplomats and the people with corporate and academic interests in the region. Last spring, as Kissinger's emissary to Lebanon, he strongly advocated—and obtained—U.S. support for Syrian efforts to crush the Palestinians in Lebanon.

Brown and Mezvinsky relayed to the Palestinians encouragement from Roy Atherton and Harold Saunders, formerly a CIA

DOCUMENT

ABU EYAD VIEWS PALESTINIAN STATE

PLO Rejects Concessions

The following are excerpts from a speech by Abu Eyad (Salah Khalaf) at a meeting held by the Cairo branch of the General Union of Palestinian Students on January 15.

Abu Eyad, who is second to Yasser Arafat in the leadership of al Fateh, presented with frankness the views of the PLO leadership on the strategic difficulties faced by the Palestinian movement, its appraisal of the current Mideast peace initiatives and the PLO's continued refusal to make any major concessions to attain a Palestinian state.

MANY ENEMIES AND NO SAFE BASE

Brothers and Sisters:

Before talking about the current situation regarding the Palestinian revolution, there are some remarks which I will make quickly so that they will provide the background and basis for what I will say to you.

The first of these is that the path of revolutionaries is always difficult and long. It is no exaggeration to say that our Palestinian revolution is facing more difficulties than any other revolution in the world has ever faced.

The most important reason for this is that the revolution's primary enemy is not the only one fighting against it. On the contrary, there are many enemies who are disguising themselves to fight against our revolution.

If we compare our revolution with that of the Vietnamese, we find that our revolution is more difficult because the Vietnamese people found support from two big countries and they had a safe base to operate from.

As for us, however, for long years before and after the outbreak of the revolution [in 1965] we lived looking for a safe base so that our revolution might securely mobilize and surge forth. We looked for a base from which we could not be struck or stabbed in the back. But we did not find this base. We tried to create this base with our labor, sweat and the blood of our fighters, but still we did not find it. Every time we found a place which we thought would be like a lung to breathe with, we received blow after blow.

[In this uniquely difficult situation,] we may be flexible in some of our policies. But this flexibility has never been at the expense of principles. When flexibility goes against our principles, objectives and general strategy, we give up flexibility, and we will fight against anyone who tries to divert our attention from our major goals.

CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVES WILL FAIL

I would like to talk frankly to you about the current initiatives to achieve a political settlement in the Middle East.

First, there will be no settlement in the foreseeable future. This is because there is nothing prompting Israel to give us a nonhumiliating, fair settlement.

What cards do we, the Arabs, hold that will make Israel withdraw and set up a Palestinian state without any strings attached? I do not believe that we have any cards enabling us to dictate a settlement. Nor will we receive a settlement as a gift.

Moreover, the new U.S. administration is still following the same old line—that there can be no Palestinian people or Palestinian state except through Jordan's King Hussein.

PALESTINIAN STATE MUST MEET PLO CONDITIONS

We have embraced the slogan of establishing a national authority on any Palestinian land to be liberated [at the 1974 meeting of the Palestinian National Council, the PLO's parliament in exile.] I do not believe that any revolution ever refuses to establish a national authority on liberated land, because to do so would be to evade its responsibility. We will not abandon this goal. However, from the first, we have defined the conditions which must be met by this state.

Everyone may be talking about a Palestinian state. The differences are not over the desire to achieve a state, but over the conditions which the state must meet. Some others advocate a nonindependent, demilitarized state affiliated with Israel and Jordan.

PLO REJECTS CONCESSIONS

On our part, we will accept a state on any land of Palestine, but we are not prepared to pay for this state the price of conciliation with, or recognition of, Israel, nor are we prepared to pay the price of being a phony state affiliated with Jordan.

This is something we can explain to the world, and the world will understand. We are against those who believe that, through giving in and offering major concessions, we can obtain something of value.

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agent and staff member for the National Security Council, now the State Department's head of Intelligence and Research. Henry Kissinger, who did not relish the prospect of closer contact with the PLO, had agreed to "go along" with his subordinates and tolerate the opening of a PLO office in Washington.

By November 18 Sartawi and Jiryis felt sufficiently assured—particularly by the report on Kissinger's position—that they filed the required forms with the Justice Department, registering Jiryis as a foreign agent representing "Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee" of the PLO. Jiryis' stated intention was to direct in Washington an office for "information and liaison" with offices and agencies of the U.S. government as well as lobbying U.S. government officials. Mezvinsky felt confident enough, based on his contacts with the State Department, to be scouting for office space. Very quickly, however, the plans went awry.

U.S. REJECTS PROJECT

Although Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had reportedly been informed earlier of the proposed opening of the office, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Simcha Dinitz, learned of it only on Saturday morning (November 20) when the *New York Times* carried a report of Jiryis' registration as a foreign agent. On Sunday Dinitz plaeed an angry phone call to Kissinger in Plains, Georgia, where he was spending the day in conference with President-elect Carter.

Kissinger, though he had acceded to the project, had no commitment to it as a matter of strategy, and withdrew his endorsement in the face of the very predictable outcry from the Israelis and Zionists. Kissinger has found Israeli intransigence

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personally annoying, and told Saunders that he preferred to leave the matter of the PLO office to the Carter administration rather than "have any more fights with that skunk" Ambassador Dinitz.

State Department spokesman Robert Funseth announced an investigation into the case, and the next day announced that the time was not "propitious" for opening a PLO office in Washington. Because of a minor technical violation in his visa, Jiryis would not receive the usual automatic 30-day extension of his tourist visa on November 30; because Sartawi had already left the country, Funseth said, there was no reason to pursue his case further.

The same day, Dean Brown visited Jiryis and assured him that he could return to Washington within a few weeks, as soon as the visa problem was straightened out. Mezvinsky, searching for a way to persuade the U.S. government to accede to the office, contacted Sartawi and advised him to get a letter from the Executive Committee of the PLO authorizing the office. Farouq Kaddoumi had denounced and disowned the Washington office plan, and therefore Mezvinsky believed that such a letter would re-strengthen the credibility of the project. Sartawi flew to Beirut, attended a meeting of Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders, and on the following day, November 28, returned to the U.S. armed with a letter, which according to the major figures in the project as well as Egyptian news sources, authorized the office in the name of the PLO Executive. Within 24 hours the letter was in Atherton's hands.

The letter did not change the climate in Washington, however. During the following week, while Sartawi was in Washington continuing his contacts, he discovered that Kissinger had definitively ruled out allowing Jiryis back into the country. Furthermore, near the end of his stay, Sartawi was harassed and rudely interrogated by U.S. security agents, investigating his travel documents. Intervention by the Egyptian ambassador brought an apology from Kissinger to the insulted Sartawi.

Soon after, Sartawi left. A mission which was intended to improve relations between the U.S. and the PLO backfired badly. The U.S. government, after giving informal assurances that Sartawi and Jiryis' work could proceed unhampered, betrayed them, thereby demonstrating their decision not to deal with even the minority within the PLO most conciliatory to the U.S.

THE "JORDANIAN OPTION"

The real significance of the episode of the PLO office in Washington is what it reveals of the development of policy in the U.S. government toward the Palestinian issue and toward the PLO. For while the U.S. government has insisted that Jordan is the proper agent to represent "Palestinian interests," second echelon officials have speculated on the possibilities and consequences of dealing with the PLO rather than Jordan's King Hussein.

Officially Secretary of State Kissinger refused to deal with the PLO, giving two essential reasons: the PLO's denial of Israel's right to exist and its use of "terrorism." Moreover, privately Kissinger has expressed a deep personal dislike for the Palestinian organization.

But even if Kissinger had been willing to sit down with the PLO, there was nothing he really wanted to talk about. He shared the official Israeli opinion that an independent Palestinian state, however restrained at inception, would in the long run be "a time bomb." Edward Sheehan, who based his book, *The Arabs, Israeli and Kissinger*, on information from Kissinger's closest Middle East aides, wrote that: "a rump Palestine . . . did not enchant Kissinger. His history books had taught him that such miniature principalities breed irredentist passions, cause subsequent explosions, provoke dangerous quarrels between great powers."

Palestinian "interests," Kissinger insisted, should be represented by Jordan in negotiations with Israel, and if Israel withdrew from a portion of the West Bank, it should be turned over to Jordan, (which controlled the Palestinian area from 1948 to 1967) though perhaps the Palestinians could be given certain limited autonomy.

NO PRESSURE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT

Following the October 1973 war, Kissinger had projected as the aim of his Middle East diplomacy a "step-by-step" series of partial disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, Syria and lastly Jordan, which would lay the basis for a comprehensive settlement between these four parties. In fact, Kissinger's partial disengagement strategy allowed him to avoid the larger issues of a comprehensive settlement, especially the demands of the Palestinian people.

Bolstering Kissinger's determination to ignore the PLO and evade the Palestine question was the tremendous advance, economically and politically, for the U.S. in the Middle East after the October 1973 war. John Campbell of the Foreign Policy Association told a congressional committee in July, 1976, that the gains were "substantial, even spectacular."

The October war heralded a new era of U.S. power in the Middle East; a number of Arab regimes shifted rightward, the U.S. improved its relations with many Arab states, and the Soviet Union's influence plummeted. And, of essential importance, U.S. economic benefits from the area zoomed. The oil price hikes which accompanied the October war were a boon to U.S. multinational energy corporations, boosting profits and making profitable the exploration and exploitation of a whole range of new energy sources in the U.S. itself. And U.S. exporters of consumer goods, certain kinds of capital goods, weapons, services and technology have found a burgeoning market in the Middle East over the last few years.

In the face of these unprecedentedly favorable economic and political conditions in the Middle East, there was no overwhelming pressure on the U.S. government to change its policies. Although some rather persuasive arguments had been made that in the long run the U.S. may have to attempt a comprehensive settlement in the region to avoid endangering its material interests in the Arab countries, the U.S. has yet to feel any painful blows to its corporate interests.

THE "PLO OPTION"

Behind the facade of arrogance, however, there were moments of doubt in the administration—moments when the limitations of Kissinger's diplomatic progress were awkwardly obvious, and when the growing power of the PLO in the area, and its increasing prestige internationally, were ominously clear. At these times especially, Kissinger's subordinates pondered the possibilities and consequences of dealing with the PLO, should the U.S. find itself able to protect its interests in the region only by sponsoring a comprehensive settlement, and should it be impossible for the U.S. to impose King Hussein as the representative of the Palestinians. Occasionally Kissinger himself toyed with this "PLO option," not as a serious strategic alternative to his preferred "Jordanian option," but rather as a tactical stick to brandish at the Israelis, or as a carrot to wave before the Arabs.

In 1974, for example, Kissinger was faced with Israeli intransigence to his plans for an interim disengagement with Jordan, as well as the meteoric rise of the PLO. Kissinger threatened Israel that the U.S. might be forced to entertain the PLO's claim to represent the people of the West Bank, rather than King Hussein's. For Kissinger this threat was only a tactical maneuver to pressure Israel into a compromise with Hussein.

But others in the State Department and National Security Council actually took the issue further. Slowly Kissinger's Middle East advisors, men like Roy Atherton and Harold Saunders in the State Department and Robert Oakley in the NSC, developed plans for a "PLO option" in case circumstances necessitated a strategic retreat from the preferred "Jordanian option."

These suggestions of a possible "PLO option" began to come

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to the surface during the spring of 1975, when Kissinger invoked a period of "reassessment" of U.S. policy in the Middle East, after his step-by-step diplomacy was blocked temporarily by Israeli obstinance. Kissinger's advisors and the semi-official foreign policy establishment began to pose a number of alternative courses for U.S. policy in the area.

Prompted by the official reassessment, an influential study group was assembled under the auspices of the Brookings Institute. Participants in the study group included Zbigniew Brzezinski, cold warrior of Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs, strategist for the Trilateral Commission, and Jimmy Carter's choice to head the National Security Council; Charles Yost, a retired diplomat; Najeeb Halaby, former chairman of Pan American Airlines; and a battery of academics, Arabists and Zionists, including William Quandt (who made a study of the Palestinian resistance for the Rand Corporation with a grant from the Defense Department, and now will be a Middle East expert on the staff of NSC), Nadav Safran, Malcolm Kerr and Morroe Berger.

The Brookings study declared that the time had come for a "comprehensive settlement," not a continuation of the step-by-step approach Kissinger had been pursuing. Part of this "comprehensive settlement" would have to include "provision for Palestinian self-determination," though the study group left open both the option of an independent state and one "voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy." The study concluded that "a solution to the Palestinian dimension of the conflict will require the participation of credible Palestinian representatives." However it remained vague on the PLO, saying only that its claim to represent the Palestinians "is not unchallenged." But the report stated unequivocally that whatever Palestinian body achieved recognition as a credible representative, would have to renounce armed struggle and recognize the legitimacy of Israel within the pre-1967 borders.

KISSINGER PROBES "PLO OPTION"

During the spring of 1975, Kissinger refused to endorse any of the options which involved dealing with the West Bank outside the Jordanian context, though he did consider the possibility of a comprehensive settlement. He wavered the next October, however, when it became clear that his step-by-step diplomacy was faltering because the Sinai Agreements which he engineered between Egypt and Israel had, by isolating Egypt from the other Arab states, blocked the possibility of further interim agreements between Israel and Syria or Jordan.

U.S. officials. Left to right: Henry Kissinger, Joseph Sisco, Roy Atherton and Harold Saunders.

Then, in his frustration, Kissinger gained President Ford's approval for a tentative, quiet diplomatic probe to see whether his subordinates' work in developing a "PLO option" could be of any use to the U.S. During this time, Kissinger carefully edited the statement of Harold Saunders, which was presented to a congressional committee in November 1975.

The Saunders statement incorporated many of the long-standing positions of the U.S. on the Palestinian question, but added to them several new factors and hints. Saunders discarded the timeworn cliche that the Palestinians are merely a humanitarian refugee problem, and called them instead a "political factor," and one which is "in many ways . . . the heart of the [Arab-Israeli] conflict."

The Saunders testimony made it clear that the U.S. would still prefer to see Jordan as the vehicle through which a "reasonable" solution to the Palestinian problem could be achieved. But the testimony also acknowledged that the PLO has achieved the backing of the Arab states and implied that the U.S. might "consider" its claims as also "reasonable" if it made several fundamental concessions: acceptance—not as a transitional goal, but as a final settlement—of a Palestinian state on territory from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; recognition of Israel's right to exist as a Zionist state; and, as a precondition to negotiations, abandonment of armed struggle.

The Saunders statement, despite its studied ambiguity, was a message to the PLO. Fuller private messages to the PLO were, by the time that Kissinger gave his approval to the exploration of his aides' "PLO option," being carried by a few people, key among them Norton Mezvinsky. Mezvinsky, in fact, claims that the Saunders statement embodied "things I'd found out and proposed," on his frequent trips between Beirut and Washington.

OBJECTIVE SITUATION CHANGES AND U.S. DISCARDS "PLO OPTION"

In October, Mezvinsky had met at least twice with interested congressmen and these talks led him to fruitful meetings with State Department officials. Mezvinsky appears to have developed a working relationship with Roy Atherton, Harold Saunders, and probably Joseph Sisco. He also spoke with Kissinger about his private diplomacy.

However, just as Mezvinsky was telling the PLO that the "doors are open" in Washington—if the PLO would publicly agree to the concessions demanded in the Saunders testimony—the doors slammed shut. All along, the U.S. government had a distinct preference for eliminating the PLO rather than negotiating with it, and the course of the civil war in Lebanon seemed to provide a new opportunity to weaken the PLO.

The Syrian initiative in Lebanon changed the objective realities in the region: in the spring Dean Brown had obtained U.S. support for the Syrian invasion—and in the U.S. talk of the "PLO option" withered as the U.S. helped to coordinate between Israel, and the Syrian expedition into Lebanon.

Fifteen months ago, at the time of the Saunders statement, the PLO was at the height of its power in Lebanon; this past November, when Jiryis was unceremoniously hurried out of Washington, the U.S. hoped that the Arab states supervising the occupation of Lebanon would severely limit the PLO. Moreover, the U.S. began signaling to these states that the main stumbling block to the settlement with Israel that the Arab states have sought, is their insistence, since the Rabat Summit in 1974, that the PLO and not Jordan represents the Palestinians. In fact, however, for some time now the Syrian regime has been

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Exposing Zionist Myths

Is The Israeli Kibbutz Socialist?

" 'Left' Zionists often claim that the kibbutz is not only socialist in itself but is actually a socialist *factor in* [Israeli] *society as a whole,* [that] the kibbutzim are the vanguard of the proletariat [and]... that socialism will come about through the proliferation of kibbutzim." —M. Machover, "Middle East for Revolutionary Socialism." 1971.

"The kibbutz still remains the only viable example of a decentralized anarchist-socialist society." —Seymour Martin Lipset, in *The New Left and The Jews.* 1972.

While the kibbutz movement saw itself as the socialist vanguard of Zionist settlement, it flourished only because it was subsidized by the Jewish Agency to spearhead the Zionist plans to dispossess the indigenous Palestinian Arabs of their lands and colonize their country.

• The kibbutz ideal of Jewish collectivist colonies is a cornerstone in the movement of "Socialist Zionism." Ber Borochov, sometimes called the father of "Socialist Zionism," wrote that, "this type of [collectivist] colonization, in which the leading role is allotted to the working class, is also the road to the socialist society in Palestine." [Quoted in Natham Weinstock, *Le Sionisme Contre Israel,* p. 353]

In 1927, the founding congress of a federation of Zionist settlements proclaimed that the kibbutz is "a collective of crystallized class consciousness" and the "vanguard cell of the future society." ["The Platform of the Kibbutz Artzi"]

The early kibbutzim rejected the earlier Zionist colonists' use of hired workers, especially Arabs, to do the hard manual work, and instead preached the doctrine of collective "self-labor" and the ennobling qualities of agricultural work. Refusing to exploit the labor of others, the kibbutzim made production an exclusively internal collective concern. [Alan Arian, *Ideological Change in Israel,* p. 91-117]

The belief of the kibbutzim that they were the cutting edge of Jewish settlement in Palestine led them from the beginning to exclude from membership the indigenous Arabs upon whose land they were settling. To this day, a Palestinian cannot join a kibbutz, even in cases where it is located on lands which his family had farmed for generations. [Matzpen, "Left Wing Zionism?" p. 48]

• This exclusivity combined with their inward-looking collectivist ardour made the kibbutzim an ideal spearhead for the colonial strategy of the Jewish Agency—which provided them operating funds and leased them Agency land rent free at locations the Agency approved. For the Jewish Agency, the kibbutz served as "the frontier bastion establishing a Zionist presence in hostile regions, reclaiming... 'the neglected land of the country,' that is to say in reality, Arab land." [Weinstock, p. 353]

• "The real significance of the kibbutz for Zionist colonization," asserts an Israeli leader of *Matzpen,* Arie Bober, has been its ability "to carry out (through great personal sacrifice) unprofitable economic tasks in order to establish the Zionist presence in hostile areas—these are the reasons why Zionist institutions financed the kibbutzim." [*The Other Israel,* p. 108]

• The kibbutzim necessarily were militaristic. As the Zionist writer, V.D. Segre, has stated, they served "as a strategic outpost,... as a military depot, as a military factory and repair shop and as a training ground for Jewish underground forces." "Its barracks sheltered agricultural workers who were also soldiers in a permanent state of alert" as they "spread over the whole country, occupying... land in the heart of the Arab countryside." [*Israel: A Society in Transition,* p. 74, 76]

Kibbutz settlers were locked in battle with the Palestinian peasantry from the beginning. For example, in 1920, one of the founders of the kibbutz movement and the advocate of "Jewish self-defense labor battalions," Josef Trumpeldor, was killed defending a settlement in the upper Galilee from neighboring Arabs. The early defense force of the first kibbutzim, the *Ha'shomer,* had as their slogan: "In blood and fire Judea fell; in blood and fire she shall rise again." [Amos Elan, *The Israelis, Founders and Sons,* p. 198]

Due to the increasing level of Arab resistance, during the latter half of the 1930's kibbutzim had to be set up as "stockade and watchtower settlements." These were elaborately militarized fortresses, set up in one day under guard of Hagana (the Zionist army), troops with prefabricated stockade walls surrounding cabins, with a searchlight-equipped watchtower. After the Hagana left, the armed settlers would cultivate the surrounding land, remaining on 24 hour alert. "It was reminiscent of how the American west had been settled," writes the pro-Zionist historian, Walter Laqueur. [*A History of Zionism,* p. 330]

Such settlements "expanded the areas of Jewish colonization," states a standard Zionist text; similarly, the kibbutzim of the mid-1940's, "assumed a leading role in the effort to [create]... faits accomplis by founding Jewish settlements in outlying areas." [*Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel,* p. 670, 1075] When the 1948 war ended with the Israeli state having conquered—with strategic aid from outlying militarized kibbutzim—80 percent of Palestine, new armed border kibbutzim were hurriedly erected on lands taken from Palestinian peasants during the war. They were assigned the specific task of stopping Palestinian refugees from infiltrating back into their own country. Similarly, after the 1967 war, the Israeli army strung Nahals [militarized kibbutzim] along the newly conquered western edge of the Jordan River and civilian kibbutzim were spread through the occupied Golan Heights. [Weinstock, p. 323]

After the establishment of the Israeli state, in 1948, the kibbutzim were pressed by their inherent economic weaknesses to undergo an industrial revolution. This in turn led them to become collective exploiters of wage labor and to introduce a class structure into kibbutz production which is erasing their earlier belief in their own "proletarian" status.

• For years most kibbutzim were money losers, not only because Zionist strategy often dictated their location on poor land or far from markets, but also because their productivity was constrained by their limited land size and labor force. They survived on subsidies from Zionist fund raising from outside Palestine.

By the 1930's, kibbutz economic theory resolved that "profitability" lay in capital intensive production, but for years thereafter most kibbutzim found themselves able to make only limited capital investments because of a lack of necessary resources. However, the rapid economic expansion which followed in the wake of the establishment of the Israeli state in

Kibbutz Tirat Zevi, with its tower and stockade, was established in 1937, during Palestinian uprisings.

1948 generated market demands and financial inputs that enabled the kibbutzim to fully realize this long sought goal. They underwent an industrial revolution, leading to intensive mechanization of agriculture and the proliferation of kibbutzim industrial plants.

At this point the kibbutzim abandoned their original commitment to the concept of "self-labor." In order to fully utilize their new assembly line factories and to "maximize" profits, they needed to hire workers from outside the kibbutzim.

By the early 1970's, the 227 existing kibbutzim had established 285 industrial plants, which accounted for ten percent of the entire Israeli industrial investment. Fifty percent of those at work in these factories were hired wage laborers, as were fourteen percent in kibbutz farming. Most of those hired laborers, are Palestinian Arabs. [Haim Barkai, "The Kibbutz: an Experiment in Microsocialism," *Israel, The Arabs and the Middle East,* ed. Howe & Gershman, p. 76-94; Gerald Kaufman, *To Build the Promised Land,* p. 112; *New York Times,* November 19, 1976; *Israc,* May 1969, p. 17]

• Since the wage paid to the hired laborer by the kibbutzim is far lower than the economic benefits awarded to the kibbutz member, even in cases where both do exactly the same work, there can be no question about the fact that much of the wealth (or the surplus value) created by the hired laborer is pocketed by the kibbutz member. [See Barkai, p. 82] Moreover, industrialization has created a social gap between skilled white collar technicians and administrators—inevitably kibbutzim members—and the hired laborers and kibbutzim members who are confined to manual, unskilled jobs. [Barkai, p. 92; Bober, p. 107]

Meir Mandel, a leader of the kibbutzim affiliated with the Israeli ruling party, Mapai, has lamented this introduction of class structure into kibbutzim production: "The kibbutzim engage salaried workers and profit from the surplus value which they create.... The use of salaried workers is leading the members of the communes more and more into specialized professions and administrative jobs, while leaving the difficult manual work to the salaried employees. This is then the first manifestation of a creation of social classes within these very communes which had struggled formerly for a social structure which would be entirely equal." [Quote excerpted from Weinstock, p. 356]

• Recently many kibbutzim have become outposts of affluence, granting their members "luxuries that most urban Israelis could not possibly afford." [Elon, p. 318] This affluent new way of life, in addition to the emerging class exploitation of kibbutz production, has contributed to a notable "de-proletarianization" of kibbutz members.

The old notion of early kibbutzim members that they were not only "workers" but moreover the "proletariat vanguard" is rapidly disappearing; at least a third of kibbutz members, in fact, believe they now belong to "the middle class," according to a social survey conducted a few years ago. [Weinstock, p. 356; Elon, p. 318]

Beginning as the subsidized tool of a land-grabbing colonization policy, the kibbutzim have been transformed by the development of Israel's modern capitalist market economy into collective capitalist enterprises. In spite of propaganda aimed at leftists abroad, few Israelis any longer believe that the kibbutzim are a model of the future Zionist society.

• A dispute split the kibbutz movement in 1921 over the question of the proper relationship of the kibbutzim to each other and to the rest of the nascent settler economy. Those arguing for nation-wide centralized economic planning lost out to those who believed that each kibbutz should be a self-ruled economic unit.

In the 1950's the kibbutzim broke their total dependency on outside Zionist subsidies and became flourishing economic enterprises. Economic "self-rule" came to mean that the continued existence of each kibbutz was now ultimately dependent upon its success as a competitive commercial enterprise. As the senior Israeli economist, Haim Barkai, has written, the "relationship with other entities, whether kibbutzim or nonkibbutzim units, are purely commercial;" since the kibbutz movement "has not attempted" to create a "democratically controlled socialist economy." Barkai adds, "it has accepted the rules of the game of a market economy." [p. 94, 97]

• Each kibbutz is a small economic unit in no way self-sufficient economically; it is geared to the production of goods to be sold at a profit in the Israeli and international capitalist market, and is dependent upon that market as its source for the purchase of most of its consumer and productive goods. Gradually that market have determined many of the fundamental qualities of the modern kibbutzim through the decisive role it plays in determining what the kibbutzim produce and how they produces it.

• The need to compete successfully in this larger economic framework has driven the kibbutzim to become not socialist but capitalist collective enterprises, engaging in more and more policies identified with typical capitalist concerns. For example, kibbutzim are increasingly entering into partnerships with private Israeli capitalist enterprises to set up large scale limited liability companies. These exist outside the kibbutz framework and depend totally upon the exploitation of wage labor. [Weinstock, p. 353-356; Kaufman, p. 111]

• Some Israelis still propogate—especially to leftists abroad—the early ideals of the movement, arguing that through the spread of "communist" kibbutzim, gradually the majority of Israelis will come to live communally, the cells of perfect socialism spreading out to cover the entire country and transforming it peacefully from capitalism to communism. The idealization of the kibbutzim has become a major component in the effort to make Zionism respectable among the international left. [Bober, p. 106; see also Saadia Gelb, *The New Left and the Jews,* p. 322]

In fact, most Israelis no longer see the kibbutzim as a national ideal or model for the future. [Elon, p. 317] Never more than seven percent of Zionist settlers lived in kibbutzim and that was in 1947; since that date the percentage has been steadily falling. Today only three percent of the Israeli population are kibbutz members. [Bober, p. 108]

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it made in the nature of the clash were to mute its military violence, and limit Syria politically. While once the Syrians seemed intent on totally subjugating the PLO to the Damascus regime, now their role in Lebanon is being overseen by Arab states—Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait in particular—which want to see the PLO contained, though not eradicated, and made to conform to the strategy of the Arab states, not to that of Syria only.

The Riyadh and Cairo conferences instituted an "Arab peacekeeping force" to police the country. The conferences did not specify the composition of the peacekeeping force by country; contingents were sent from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join Sudanese and Libyan troops which had been stationed in Lebanon since an earlier point in the hostilities.

By December 1, however, the Libyan troops had been withdrawn, with Libyan President Qadafi charging that the Arab forces were being used not to enforce the Riyadh-Cairo agreement impartially, but to repress the Palestinians. The overwhelming majority of the "Arab" forces were, in fact, the very Syrian troops which had invaded Lebanon. And it was these troops which seemed to have nearly all the heavy weapons at the disposal of the Arab troops. Syrian tanks rumbled through the streetes of the city at night, and Syrian machinegunners sandbagged their positions along highways and at strategically located crossroads and traffic circles.

SYRIAN TROOPS AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS

It was not long before Syrian troops became aggressive. On December 4 and 8, Syrian troops attacked offices of the Lebanese branch of the pro-Iraqi Baath Party in Tripoli, a city in northern Lebanon where much of that organization's strength is concentrated. In actions condemned by the Lebanese Front of Nationalist and Progressive Forces and by the PLO, Syrian troops seized Baath militants and attacked the home of the regional Command leader.

In mid-December, Syrian soldiers began occupying the offices of Beirut newspapers: beginning with the pro-Libyan *as Safir* and two pro-Iraqi dailies, *al Moharrer* (especially close to the Palestinian resistance) and *Beirut*, and eventually closing even the very moderate *an Nahar*, Beirut's leading newspaper. Predictably the leftist newspaper *al Hurriya* and the Lebanese Communist Party's *an Nidal*, were shut down and *Wafa*, the PLO news service, lost its Telex facilities. Syrian troops withdrew from the offices only when the government under Lebanese President Elias Sarkis, instituted censorship; all material must now be approved by a censor (inevitably reactionary and Christian) before publication. A number of the closed papers later began to publish again.

Syrian troops bulldoze through roadblock on Beirut street.

Censorship was also extended to the foreign media, which had to have its reportage approved by the censor before it could be sent out. The main purpose of this move, the censors have bluntly stated, is to prevent the PLO from continuing to use Beirut as a center for disseminating information: reporters were even told that any dispatch quoting a PLO representative will not be approved. After three weeks, pre-publication censorship of the foreign media was lifted, apparently because Western diplomats and businessmen argued that it projected an image of instability, impeded the flow of information and would therefore hamper the return of foreign banks and business. Foreign correspondents must now submit a copy of their reports within 24-hours of dispatch; if it displeases the censor, they can be imprisoned, fined and deported without specification of charge or opportunity for appeal.

The Sarkis regime, while patently not in charge either of Lebanon or of the Arab security forces nominally under Sarkis' command, is becoming a junior partner in repression. Besides the institution of censorship, the government is now ruling by decree for six months, bypassing whatever limited democracy is afforded by the Lebanese Parliament.

The most graphic example of the repressive potential of the Syrian regime in Lebanon is their direct administration of the Bekaa plain, which Syrian troops occupied last June. People now living in Beirut whose home villages are in the Bekaa tell stories of sudden arrests on political suspicion, and a virtual police state apparatus which requires permits for travel. The local pro-Syrian Baath party, infused with artificial strength by the Syrian occupation, is being built up to help implement Syrian policy. In the Bekaa there is no pretense that Sarkis, rather than Syria, is governing. There have been published reports of armed resistance actions in the Bekka, and of hundreds of persons taken into custody for "sabotage" and other political charges, then jailed, often across the border in Syria.

The danger that the real role of the Arab troops, with their Syrian backbone, is repression rather than peacekeeping is underlined by their obviously inequitable deployment. A local official of the right-wing Phalange Party in Jounieh, the port north of Beirut through which arms and other supplies are shipped to the rightists, commented to a visitor in November that the presence of Syrian troops in Jounieh "is only a formality. They have nothing against us," he said, "but they have to have token forces here or the other side will point that out."

PLO RESPONSE

It is not surprising that the PLO and Lebanese leftists have been unwilling to comply with the clause of the Riyadh agreement calling for all heavy weapons to be placed under the control of the Arab security forces. After considerable delay, the PLO and Lebanese left complied with a new deadline, but in a merely token manner. Units of the Palestine Liberation Army, the PLO's regular troops, left Lebanon under pressure, but aside from this, to date the Palestinian and nationalist forces have relinquished only a part of their heavy armament.

The PLO is determined that in Lebanon it will not allow itself to be out-maneuvered as it was in Jordan in 1970-71—that it will not be pushed back step by step and finally eliminated. There is a great stress on remaining in the cities and urban concentrations, taking a lesson from the aftermath of Black September in Jordan, when the fedayeen left Amman and the refugee camps and towns for the Ajloun forest, where they were crushed by Jordanian King Hussein's troops, far from the Palestinian masses who could have lent valuable support. In Lebanon now the PLO leadership is determined that the Arkoub mountain area of southern Lebanon will not become a new Ajloun.

On the other hand, the PLO leadership is trying to avoid, as far

PALESTINE! INTERVIEWS FAWAZ TRABULSI

Lebanese Leftist Assesses War Results

Fawaz Trabulsi, a leader of the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL), was interviewed by a staff member of Palestine! *in Lebanon last November, just after the Arab security force had entered west Beirut.*

The Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon is part of the Front of Nationalist and Progressive Parties and Forces; this broad Lebanese front is composed of nationalist, Baathist, Nasserist, socialist, communist and other progressive groups, and presided over by Kamal Jumblatt.

OCAL, an independent organization of Marxist-Leninists, was founded in 1971, and has developed a base among the Lebanese poor and working people.

The Lebanese left is closely allied with the PLO in Lebanon.

From the Lebanese point of view, we have emphasized two goals: First, defense of the Palestinian resistance, which is a Lebanese patriotic duty, and secondly, achievement of a minimum platform of internal reform in Lebanon. In opposition to our goals was a plan to maintain by force of arms a very archaic confessional system and to eliminate the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon.

Until Syria entered, the balance of forces [the Lebanese national movement and the Palestinians, versus the Lebanese right] was positive. After Syria entered there was a less positive balance of forces. Under the pressure of three [Syrian] divisions the fascists managed to score some military advances.

But when we were faced with the Syrian invasion, we had no choice but to fight. At least what's been achieved is a checkmate to the avowed plan of the fascists to resettle the Palestinians all over the Arab world and to partition Lebanon, and we managed to defeat the plan to re-establish the system of confessional privileges in Lebanon [under which all government positions are assigned according to religious sect and the Maronite Christian bourgeois and semi-feudal classes dominate the government and economy of the country].

For the Lebanese, our platform for overall radical change has to be more modest now; at present not all points of this platform can be achieved. We are struggling now primarily for the abolition of sectarianism in the system of political representation, in the bureaucracy and civil service, and for the rebuilding of the Lebanese army on a non-sectarian basis, to assume its national duties.

After Syria invaded last spring and tipped the balance of forces against us, there have been no more military victories left to win. The fighting lines have been relatively fixed for some time now. And besides, we have always maintained that we have been fighting with only half of our forces: the rest of our potential forces are on the other side [of military lines] now, and because of the problems of sectarianism, we can't reach them politically while war is raging. We are for putting an end to the war.

We are pressing for a limited security role now for Syria, and emphasizing the importance of a political settlement among the parties [in Lebanon].

Internationally, there has been a strong movement of solidarity in Europe. On the part of the socialist countries, though, we would have liked a stronger political attitude, more threats to the U.S., more pressure, especially on the issue of the Israeli naval blockade, which is a violation of international law. Without trying to excuse it, however, the USSR found itself devoid of Arab allies."

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as possible, clashes with Syria or the other Arab states overseeing affairs in Lebanon. Lines seem to have been drawn on a certain number of critical issues—the PLO will not be disarmed, and will not tolerate the interference of Arab states in internal Palestinian affairs—but on less essential questions, there is a strong effort to avoid conflict. The PLO's approach seems to be an amalgam of determination and diplomatic delay.

RIGHTISTS FAILED IN OBJECTIVES

The present day to day events in Lebanon can be understood only in two contexts: that of the results of the civil war, and that of the inter-Arab and international situation.

Politically, the Lebanese right, which launched the civil war, failed to succeed in either of its two objectives. It was not able to crush the PLO in Lebanon, and even less was it able to accomplish its more extreme announced objective of dispersing the Palestinians now living in Lebanon throughout the Arab world. Secondly, the right was not able to seize hegemonic power in Lebanon, nor was it able to achieve its fall-back program of partitioning the country. The only gains for the right politically have been in indirectly bringing about stronger measures by the Arab states to supervise the PLO, and in expelling tens of thousands of Palestinians and poor Lebanese Moslems from shanty towns and refugee camps in the now purely Christian regions of the country.

Moreover, these gains, limited as they are, were made for the most part during the period when the Syrian troops were supporting the rightists militarily. Now cracks are appearing in the right-Syrian alliance. The uncensored right-wing press is calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the center of the fascist-controlled areas to the border areas, and recently a massive demonstration was staged in East Beirut against the entry of the Arab security force there. While the right is still pressing for division of Lebanon—in terms of "cantonment" now rather than "partition"—Syria and the other Arab states, as well as the government of President Sarkis, are determined that Lebanon remain a unitary state.

PLO INTACT AND INDEPENDENT

Merely by denying their enemies on the right their objective of eliminating the organized Palestinian presence in Lebanon, the Palestinian groups have achieved a limited victory through their survival. To assess the interrelationship of political and military factors is complex, and to estimate the strength of the Palestinians, politically and militarily, vis-a-vis the right and the Arab states involved in Lebanon is still more difficult. It can be said safely, however, that the Palestinian resistance has emerged from the civil war and Syrian invasion with its

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organizations intact and independent in their internal processes. The degree of political mobilization and support among the masses of Palestinians in Lebanon, as well as among the progressive Lebanese, is greater than ever.

Militarily, according to frequently voiced estimates, the Palestinians and left Lebanese forces are greater in numbers than before the fighting began, despite the loss of perhaps 2,000 Palestinian fighters, many of them experienced cadre. Mobilization during the fighting—including Palestinian conscription—brought many new fighters to their ranks. Furthermore, they gained experience, and many who were previously trained only in small-unit guerrilla fighting are now able to participate in large-scale regular combat.

HUMAN AND ECONOMIC DEVASTATION

The civil war devastated Lebanon, both in human and economic terms. No one really knows how many people have been killed in the fighting, but the figure of 60,000 is plausible. Among the Palestinians, 30,000 are estimated killed and 50,000 permanently crippled.

The civilian population of the progressive forces sustained far more casualties than that of the reactionaries, for a number of reasons: the fascist operations against the Palestinian and poor Lebanese slums in the areas of Beirut's "Belt of Misery" which the rightists took over between January and August of 1976 (including Debaiye, Qarantina, Maslkh, an Nabaa, Tal az Zaatar and others) frequently involved the bombardment of ramshackle homes which provided their inhabitants little protection, and were followed by massacres. Furthermore, the right shelled other Palestinian-nationalist areas where the population was often poor and densely packed into insubstantial homes or marketplaces; a single hit could result in many casualties. In contrast, the progressive Lebanese-Palestinian military operations were much less directed against civilian populations, and in any event, the residents of the right-held areas tended to live in sturdier and less crowded structures.

The damage to the Lebanese economy directly from war and looting, has been enormous. An estimate by a Lebanese government committee put the figure at $4 billion of actual physical damage, and a total of $12 billion, including loss of revenues during the period of fighting and the time that will be required for rebuilding. Beirut's Chamber of Commerce and Industry Chairman Adnam Kassar announced that about 6000 shops have been looted or destroyed in that city alone. The recently appointed Prime Minister, Salim al Hoss, had been at work for some time on a reconstruction plan that will channel foreign contributions from the West and Arab states through Lebanese government institutions to the private sector—a plan that suggests potential bonanzas for businessmen and little relief for destituted workers and the poor who have lost their homes and property.

RIGHTWARD SHIFT OF ARAB REGIMES

The events in Lebanon need also be understood in the Arab and international context. The problems and tensions which led to the civil war are not only derived from the class structure, sectarian divisions and question of the Palestinians in that country, but as well from factors relating to the rapid shift to the right among the Arab regimes generally, and to their attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the role of the United States.

Activity among the Arab states has been led by a triumverate of Syria's Hafiz al Assad the policeman, Egypt's Anwar Sadat the politician, and Saudi King Khalid the financier. Palestinian and left Lebanese activists and supporters complain that they have had no real help from the Arab states, sometimes making the single exception of Iraq, which is said to have contributed material support.

There are certain contradictions among the triumverate, however, which cannot help but be advantageous to the Palestinians and progressive Lebanese. All now seem to be agreed that as part of a settlement the Israelis must withdraw from the West Bank and a Palestinian entity be established there. While Egypt and Saudi Arabia had tended to emphasize the independence of a Palestinian State, a Palestinian resistance leader recently laughingly interpreted this to mean "independence from Syria." He was sure that Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while jealous of Syrian power in the area, were intent on exerting their own conservative influence on any Palestinian state.

Syria, on the other hand, has been pushing for a "federation" to include a Palestinian West Bank State, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, which would dominate. King Hussein of Jordan, whose "United Arab Kingdom" plan floated the possibility of a federation between a Palestinian West Bank and the Jordanian East Bank, under his royal rule, now gives lip service to "Palestinian self-determination." Yet he recently told the *Washington Post* that "I believe that the future may well see some kind of fedreation or confederation based on the desire of all concerned." Sadat, moreover, has indicated that he tends to believe federation of a Palestinian state with Jordan is the best ultimate solution.

ARAB TRIUMVERATE GROWING CLOSER

The three Arab powers are growing closer, however, and have apparent unity in strategy now on a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These states seem to be agreed on seeking withdrawal through the United States, and on adopting a conciliatory attitude toward Israel and a highly favorable attitude toward the U.S. Three examples illustrate this direction:

* The "peace initiative" launched under the leadership of Egyptian President Sadat, which stresses the themes of amenability to terms easy on Israel and closeness to the U.S. The peace initiative comprises conciliatory statements towards Israel and hints of a willingness to give Jordan's King Hussein a role in negotiation of Palestinian issues. However, since the January riots and mass protests over economic policy have weakened his regime, the role of Sadat internationally is somewhat uncertain.

* The Saudi oil price policy. When Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Zaki Ahmad Yamani refused to go along with the demand of other OPEC members at the recent Qatar conference for a phased 15 percent oil increase, the producer group was forced, for the first time, to have two prices for crude oil: 10 percent for most OPEC members and 5 percent for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Yamani announced that Saudi Arabia expected to be rewarded for this favor to the (capitalist) world economy—an implicitly, the favor was not merely the immediate economic benefit, but the breaking of the unity of OPEC—with a favorable U.S. attitude on the issues of a Middle East settlement.

* The deal on Southern Lebanon. Israel had taken advantage of the civil war, which drew Palestinian forces away from the southern border, to establish a sphere of influence there in order to construct a *cordon sanitaire* in the area and seal the border to commando raids. Ferrying right wing soldiers from Jounieh to the south, training Lebanese fighters in Israel, sending them back to Lebanon armed with U.S. Sherman tanks, and promising Israeli artillery support, the Zionists created a new fact in the south.

The Lebanese nationalists have been demanding that the Arab states reestablish Lebanese sovereignty in the south. In fact, however, Syria and Israel have been negotiating, through George Lane, the U.S. charge in Beirut, toward a solution which would insulate Israel from the fedayeen. This issue has shown the willingness of the Arab states to conciliate with Israel, through the good offices of the U.S., at the expense not only of Palestinian freedom of action, but also of Arab national interests generally. □

UP TO DATE

AMERICANS PROTESTING U.S., SYRIAN AND ISRAELI COLLUSION IN LEBANON held a march and vigil at the White House on November 12 in Washington, D.C.

The newly-formed Washington Palestine Solidarity Committee, sponsor of the event, focused attention on the direction of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Speakers condemned this policy aimed at the "liquidation of the Palestinian resistance by local agents of U.S. interests—Syria and Israel—in preparation for a 'Pax Americana' which denies the national right of the Palestinian people."

Noting examples of arms flowing under U.S. auspices to the Lebanese right-wing, the Palestine Solidarity Committee called for a full and open congressional investigation into the American role in the war in Lebanon.

In unseasonably cold weather, about 50 people participated in the demonstration, heard speeches on the situation in Lebanon and messages of solidarity with the Palestinians and progressive Lebanese.

THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS PROMISED $6.5 MILLION TO BETHLEHEM'S MAYOR ELIAS FREIJ as a grant to the municipality for 1977, the mayor recently indicated. Freij, the only mayor elected in the West Bank's municipal elections last spring who was not identified as a Palestinian nationalist, reported that the aid will be received in January if the Arab states give the Jordanian government funds promised for the West Bank. Other mayors on the West Bank are said to be seeking to receive money directly from the donor states, rather than through Hussein, who has used payments to the West Bank to extend his influence there in the past. The municipalities of the West Bank are believed not to have received any grants from Jordan for some time now, desite the fact the Hebron was promised a reported $9 million in August.

PALESTINIAN WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS on the West Bank have launched a campaign for the adoption of orphans from Tal az Zaatar. Palestinian families on the West Bank are currently registering to adopt the children.

AL FAJR, A PALESTINIAN NATIONALIST DAILY NEWSPAPER will reappear in Jerusalem with a new editor, Bashir Bargouti, said to be a member of the banned Palestinian Communist Organization (an autonomous section of the Jordanian Communist Party). The paper supported the program of the PLO previously, and will continue to do so under the new editor.

A previous editor of **Al Fajr**, Joe Nasser, disappeared from his home three years ago. Agents of Jordan's King Hussein, or of the pro-Jordanian Sheikh Ali Jaabari, were rumored to have kidnapped and murdered the journalist, after he had printed a series of strong attacks on Hussein and Ali Jaabari, accusing them of betraying the Palestinian cause.

STUDENTS IN NABLUS DEMONSTRATED AGAINST UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 on November 22, the ninth anniversary of its passage. The resolution has been opposed by Palestinians because it calls for recognition of the Israeli state and because it deals with the Palestinian issue only as a humanitarian "refugee problem." Since 1967, a number of UN resolutions have, however, upheld Palestinian national rights.

The students in Nablus shouted slogans against the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and against King Hussein of Jordan, which ruled the West Bank from 1948 to 1967.

ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE WEST BANK ARRESTED 66 PERSONS in raids in December, and accused them of membership in "terrorist cells." According to the official announcement, four cells of al Fateh were uncovered, three of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and one of the Popular Front General Command.

An al Fateh cell was accused of five operations in the town of Hebron, including attacks on a post office and the Labor Office, which sends Palestinian workers for jobs in Israel.

THE ONLY ZIONIST SETTLEMENT in the occupied territories not legalized by the Israeli government has, nonetheless, been allowed to develop for a year. There are 83 "legal" settlements built or being built on land occupiedin 1967.

On December 8, 1975, the Israeli government told a group of settlers they could remain at Camp Kaddum for only three months. A year later, the government has not kept its promise to move the settlement which has grown in numbers to 200 and produces metal parts for the Israeli military under a defense subcontract.

Israel has come under intense international criticism for its settlement of the Palestinian land it occupied militarily in 1967. Camp Kaddum is situated in a densely populated Palestinian area near the city of Nablus.

THE MOST POPULAR LIGHT WEAPON AMONG THE RHODESIAN WHITE MINORITY IS THE ISRAELI UZZI submachinegun. **Yedioth Aharonot** reported that the Uzzi is selling for more than a thousand dollars there.

THE ARREST OF ABU DAOUD in Paris in January was the work of one of the French secret services which is in conflict with the Foreign Ministry, according to a report by Alexander Cockburn and James Ridgeway in the **Village Voice**. (Abu Daoud is an al Fateh official whom Israel has accused of "masterminding" the operation at the Munich.Olympics.)

According to their report, the DST, which comes under the Ministry of the Interior and is one of four official secret services in France, has been closely cooperating with Israeli agents since the time of the Algerian war. The Israeli agents are allowed to operate virtually unfettered in France, where four Palestinian patriots have been murdered in the last several years. No one has been arrested for the murders.

Cockburn and Ridgeway wrote that the DST arrested Abu Daoud, who was in Paris under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry, to sabotage a French-Egyptian arms deal. The French Defense Minister was in Egypt discussing the arms deal at the time. The DST informed West Germany, which has a warrant for Abu Daoud's arrest, in order to complicate the matter as much as possible. However, in what was widely interpreted as a political rather than juridicial decision, a French court released Abu Daoud.

The DST kidnapped and murdered in 1965 a Moroccan revolutionary leader, Mehdi Ben Barka, as a favor to the Moroccan monarchy, according to the account in the **Voice.**

ISRAEL AND TRANSKEI MAY BE DEVELOPING TIES. Transkei, an area in South Africa designated as a "homeland" for blacks was granted "independence" recently by the South African regime, a measure designed to legitimize its policy of apartheid. The UN denounced the scheme for "independence" for Transkei as a farce, and no foreign government has recognized the new "state."

In mid-September an agricultural delegation from Transkei, headed by its former agricultural minister, visited Israel. The visitors conferred with Israeli Agricultural Minister Aharon Uzan and toured agricultural developments in Israel. The Transkei delegation "was seeking agricultural aid from Israel but no agreement was signed," according to Israeli radio.

In October Chief Kaiser Matanzima, the prime minister of Transkei, "expressed the hope that his country will shortly have relations with Israel," Jerusalem radio reported. "In a conversation with our correspondent," the report continued, "Chief Matanzima said he sees the Israelis as friends of his country."

ISRAEL DENIED A GROUP OF U.S. SENATORS PERMISSION TO TOUR THE NUCLEAR FACILITY at Dimona. The visiting Senators, who requested to see the installation in early November, were studying "how supervision and control both (in Israel) and in Egypt can insure that atomic energy will be for peaceful purposes only," Senator Abraham Ribicoff explained in Tel Aviv, before being denied access.

Israel has reprocessed spent nuclear fuel from a reactor in Dimona for the manufacture of as many as 20 nuclear bombs, according to press reports earlier this year. Israel has now asked the U.S. for two nuclear reactors which it claims to want solely for nuclear power generation.

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RESOURCES

Available from the Palestine Solidarity Committee:

☐ Schleifer, Abdullah; THE FALL OF JERUSALEM. Monthly Review Press, 1972; 247p., $3.45 ppbk.
A fine combination of prose and journalism that places the 1967 war in the context of Arab and Palestinian resistance to Western and Israeli aggression. Looks at the international politics that preceded the 1967 war, and gives an eyewitness account by the writer of the fall of Jerusalem.

☐ Stetler, Russell, ed.; PALESTINE: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. Ramparts Press, 1972; 297p., $2.95 ppbk.
Useful articles on the nature of Israeli society and its relationship to U.S. imperialism. Selections from political documents of major Palestinian groups, interviews with Palestinians who experienced the "Black September" attack on their movement, and the "Diary of a Resistance Fighter." Missing is the resistance strategy following the Black September, 1970 massacre.

☐ Boder, Arie, ed.; THE OTHER ISRAEL: THE RADICAL CASE AGAINST ZIONISM. Doubleday-Anchor, 1972; 264p., $2.50 ppbk.
A collection of anti-Zionist analytical articles on the history, ideology, economic development and class structure of Israel and Zionism, by members of the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen).

☐ Leon, Abram, THE JEWISH QUESTION: A MARXIST INTERPRETATION, Pathfinder, 1970; 270p., $2.95 ppbk.
Written during World War II by a Belgian Trotskyist. A serious attempt at Marxist analysis, its research and insights are useful, and serves as an antidote to Zionist interpretations of Jewish history.

☐ Palestine Solidarity Committee; ZIONISM IN PALESTINE: THE COLONIAL PROCESS. 1976; 8p., 1-5 copies, $.50; 6 or more, $.25.
A brief history of Zionism from its European origins to the present. Traces the relationship of Zionism to British and U.S. imperialism, and its oppression of the Palestinian people.

☐ Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim and Abu-Laban, Baha, eds.; SETTLER REGIMES IN AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD: THE ILLUSION OF ENDURANCE. Medina University Press International, 1974; 251p., $4.95 ppbk.
Fifteen original essays that examine in depth the growth of Zionist ideology, the process of Zionist colonial settlement in Palestine, and the resulting Palestinian response. Other essays look at settler regimes in Africa and the South African apartheid ties with Zionists.

☐ Turki, Fawaz: THE DISINHERITED: JOURNAL OF A PALESTINIAN EXILE. Monthly Review, 1972: 156 p., $2.95 ppbk.
A poignant description of the life of a Palestinian undergoing exile and oppression in the Arab host country. Personal aspect of book valuable.

☐ Langer, Felicia; WITH MY OWN EYES. Ithaca Press, 1974; 166p., $4.00 ppbk.
A detailed study of a number of Palestinians arrested for resisting Israeli occupation. The author is an Israeli lawyer and member of Rakah, the Israeli Communist Party. Documents the plight of Palestinian political prisoners, the denial of their human rights and the use of torture.

☐ Jiryis, Sabri; THE ARABS IN ISRAEL. Monthly Review, 1976; 320 p., $12.50 hdbk. Expanded and updated.
An account of the Palestinian-Arab people in Israel from 1948 to 1973. Documents land expropriation, deprivation of civil rights, and massacres in Israel. The author was an Arab lawyer in Israel.

☐ PALESTINE AND ZIONISM. 1975; 44p., $0.50.
Speeches given by the PLO at the 1975 UN General Assembly debate on Palestine. Also includes the text of five resolutions that were passed in 1974 and 1975 supporting Palestinian national rights and national liberation.

☐ Stevens, Richard P. and Elmessiri, Abdelwahab M.; ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE PROGRESSION OF A RELATIONSHIP New World Press, 1976; 214 p., $6.00 ppbk.
A series of essays in which the authors examine the historical parallels in the development of the two countries, as well as current information on their relationship. The book also contains an extensive collection of articles and documents from numerous sources, including the Israeli and South African press and the PLO Research Center.

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☐ #49 THE LEFT IN ISRAEL. Surveys the organizations of the progressive movement inside the pre-1967 Israeli borders.
☐ #50 ARAB WOMEN WORKERS. Includes section on "The Proletarianization of Palestinian Women in Israel."

☐ Childers, Erskine; THE WORDLESS WISH: FROM CITIZENS TO REFUGEES. Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1973; 41p., $1.00 ppbk.

☐ Ruedy, John; DYNAMICS OF LAND ALIENATION (IN PALESTINE); Abu-Lughod, Janet; THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE. Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1973; 44p., $1.00 ppbk.

☐ Hanegbi, Machover, Orr; THE CLASS NATURE OF ISRAEL. Israeli Socialist Organization, 1971; 24p., $0.25.

☐ THE ABC OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, PART 1, 1896-1949. The Arab Women's Information Committee; 70p., $1.00.

☐ DAVID AND GOLIATH COLLABORATE IN AFRICA. The Africa Research Group, 1969; 17p., $0.25.

☐ PALESTINE LIVES. Paredon Records, $5.00. Sixteen songs in Arabic by Al Fateh members.

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RASHED HUSSEIN BURIED IN HOMELAND

Palestinian Poet Dies in New York

Rashed Hussein, a Palestinian poet and New York correspondent for WAFA, the news agency of the PLO, died in an accidental fire in his apartment on February 1.

Rashed Hussein was born in 1936 in Musmus, a village in the Galilee region of Palestine, and remained in his homeland for many years under Israeli rule. After being dismissed from his post as a school teacher because of his nationalist beliefs, Rashed Hussein turned to journalism and literary work. He edited a journal, *Al Fajr*, which was later closed in 1962 by the Israeli government, and wrote for a Hebrew paper, *Ha-olam Hazeh*. He translated Hebrew literary writings to Arabic and Palestinian folksongs from Arabic to Hebrew.

Rashed Hussein participated actively in Al Ard, the Palestinian nationalist movement which was organized inside Israel in the late 1950's and later banned by the government. He was imprisoned by Israeli authorities a number of times, the last on charges of having recited his poetry in an Arab village where he was not allowed in to enter.

In 1967 Rashed Hussein chose exile over life under harsh Israeli repression in his native Palestine. He came to New York City, and continued to write poetry. At the time of his death he had published three volumes of his work.

Rashed Hussein's body was flown to his village of Musmus, where he was buried on February 7. Thousands of Palestinians attended the funeral. Toufiq Zayad, the Communist mayor of nearby Nazareth, said during the services, "We shall never give in until the goal that Rashed Hussein and his friends advocated, fought for and struggled for is fulfilled."

Close associates of Rashed Hussein, including Zehdi Terzi, head of the PLO office here, gave memorial addresses at a service held in New York City on February 8, which was attended by several hundred people.

TENT #50 (SONG OF A REFUGEE)

by Rahsed Hussein

Tent #50, on the left, is my new world,
Shared with me by my memories:
Memories as verdant as the eyes of spring,
Memories like the eyes of a woman weeping,
And memories the color of milk and love!

Two doors has my tent, two doors like two wounds
One leads to the other tents, wrinkle-browed
Like clouds no longer able to weep;
And the second—a rent in the ceiling, leading
To the skies,
Revealing the stars
Like refugees scattered,
And like them, naked.

Also the moon is trudging there
Downcast and weary as the UNRWA,
Yellow as though it were the UNRWA
Under a load of yellow cheese for the refugees.

Tent #50, on the left, that is my present,
But it is too cramped to contain a future!
And—"Forget!" they say, but how can I?

Teach the night to forget to bring
Dreams showing me my village
And teach the wind to forget to carry me
The aroma of apricots in my fields!
And teach the sky, too, to forget to rain.

Only then, I may forget my country.

TO MY BROTHER FATHI

by Rashed Hussein

For your sake, Fathi,
I broke the lock on my lips,
For you
I slaughtered silence in my heart
To write these lines
To build a wall in the face of death.
For you, Fathi, believe me,
I cast the letters to make a sentence.

Fathi,
The sun that bathes the wounds of the fig trees
Its rays are dyed in blood by the executioners of Auares
That same sun toasts the wheat into gold in the fields of China
It wrings tears from the foreheads of peasants in our village.
You may not understand Fathi
But tomorrow you shall grow up
And the field will grow a green root before your eyes
And the lungs of the brown planter's sun will be crucified.
Who knows—
You may accept or reject the present reality;
If you reject you shall grow up,
If you acquiesce you become smaller.

Fathi
You may not understand
Why the East is tired of silence
Or why the dead vomited, and gave death
A bridge.
Or why your feet cried or why I wrote this
But tomorrow you shall grow and understand.
For your sake—for the children—
Believe me.

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PLO [Con't. from page 7]

championing the rehabilitation of Jordan as a claimant to the West Bank, and Sadat, while continuing to assert the rights of the PLO to the West Bank, stated that a Palestinian entity formally linked to Jordan is the best solution.

The "PLO option" for Middle East policy has never been taken seriously on the decision-making level in the U.S. government. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Carter administration will in the coming months adopt such a strategy. Early signs of the probability of a continuing negative attitude in Washington include Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's recent remarks rejecting any U.S. contacts with the PLO, and the announcement, at the time of Zbiginiew Brzezinski's appointment to the National Security Council, that he was withdrawing his signature from the Brookings Institute Study, because of its conclusions, mild though they were, concerning the possible desirability of a Palestinian state. Furthermore, Brzezinski is known to have stated privately recently that the U.S. will never recognize the PLO.

Jiryis Excluded From U.S.

The new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, personally rejected a visa application from Sabri Jiryis to enter the U.S. as the guest of the American Friends Service Committee to speak at its mid-February conference.

Last fall, Jiryis had been allowed into the country though the Ford Administration knew he was a PLO representative. But this time his visa was turned down because, according to State Department spokesman Frederick Z. Brown's announcement on February 8, U.S. policy forbids "anyone affiliated with the PLO to come to the U.S. . . . for political activity."

Jiryis had flown to the Sudan in December to amend the technical error on his passport which had been used to force his earlier departure from the U.S.; he received a corrected passport personally signed by the Sudanese Interior Minister. Jiryis had then hoped to return to the U.S. in the first days of the Carter administration to set up the PLO office planned back in November.

Prevented from entering the U.S. even to speak at a Quakers' conference, Jiryis' chances of being allowed to set up the office in the near future are now apparently nil. The State Department has indicated that, as a matter of policy, it will not grant the necessary waivers needed for PLO members to enter the U.S.; the waivers are needed because the PLO has been listed as a proscribed organization by the Justice Department.

"PLO OPTION" IS INVITATION FROM U.S. FOR PLO TO SELF-DESTRUCT

If the previous and incoming administrations have not intended to invoke the "PLO option," why have so many hints floated out from the second echelons of power, and from influential men who surround the government?

In function, if not in intention, the "PLO option" is an invitation to the PLO to self-destruct. The terms of the invitation specify that the PLO recognize the legitimacy of Israel and renounce its own claim to secular demoeracy for all of Palestine. In addition to the political problems and limitations this poses for the long run, such a concession by the PLO would destroy the unity not only of the PLO as an organization, but of the Palestinians as a people. Moreover, the invitation demands that the PLO renounce its right to armed action. But without arms, the PLO is at the mercy of the Israelis, the Arab states, and all forces unfriendly to it. And finally, a number of sources recently have indicated that the invitation requires that the potential Palestinian state be under the tutelage of the United States, that it eliminate Palestinian leftist organizations.

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And what reason is there to believe that the U.S. would honor this half-hearted invitation, never clearly written out, always offered in innuendos that are soon clarified away? Particularly what would compel the U.S. to honor such an invitation to a PLO stripped of its power—a PLO which had docilely torn itself asunder by recognizing Israel, which had disarmed itself and which had purged itself of leftist members?

The threat implied in the invitation is rendered much less dangerous by two factors: the first is the determination of the PLO and the Palestinian people which it represents to realize their full national rights. Secondly, the lack of cordiality with which the invitation is so tentatively given makes it quite unattractive. If any further proof of this were needed, the U.S. government provided it with its insulting treatment of Sartawi and Jiryis in November. □